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ABSTRACT
A model is presented for the attack of two defended target complexes
with a fixed force of imperfect missiles. The attackers will be directed
first at the defensive system then at the targets themselves. The imper-
fect defenders are used against the attackers on a one-for-one basis as
long as defenders remain. If any attacker penetrates the defensive system,
all the defenders at that target complex are destroyed. The problem
addressed is the offensive problem of determining how many attackers to
send to each defensive system and to each target complex. The necessary













The purpose of the research reported here is to analyze a ballistic
missile attack against defended targets with the purpose of determining
effective targeting tactics for the offense.
Basically we consider two target complexes each containing a known
number of targets. Each complex is defended by a known number of defen-
sive missiles each of which can defend any target in the complex.
The attacking missiles can be directed at the defensive missiles
or at the target themselves. If an attacking missile is aimed at the
defensive system and it penetrates the defense, it destroys the entire
defensive complex. The attack is assumed to be sequential. The offense
first commits some number of its attackers to the defensive system, then
it attacks the targets. The defense is assumed to be one-on-one, but this
can be modified. Both the offensive and defensive missiles are imperfect,
each working with some probability.
The offensive problem is to determine how its fixed force of
attackers should be allocated between the two target complexes and how
many of the attackers should be allocated to the defensive system at each
complex. We assume that the offense receives no information about the
success or failure of its weapons in the course of the attack. The
measure of effectiveness used is to maximize the expected number of targets
destroyed.
This report describes the computations involved in the allocation
model and solves a sample problem for illustration. Several generaliza-
tions are mentioned.
Measure of Effectiveness.
This section discusses the choice of the measure of effectiveness
used in the allocation model. The ballistic missile attack, is analyzed
from the offensive point of view. The objective of the analysis is to
determine tactics which will permit the offense to use his forces more
effectively. The term "more effective use of resources" must be trans-
lated into terms which can be used unambigously to guide the offense in
its weapon deployment.
Aside from the deterrent effect, the purpose of the offensive system
is to destroy targets. It would be desirable in an actual attack to
destroy, if possible, the most valuable set of targets, but then we have
the problem of determining or assigning target values. No general agree-
ment can be reached regarding the values to be assigned; and even if
agreement could be reached, any values assigned could not reflect inter-
actions between targets. For example, the value of an industrial target
depends very much on the continued existence of a power plant to run it.
It is assumed that if some targets have a value which is obviously
large compared to most of the others, these targets will be given special
consideration in targeting. The majority of the targets, however, are
assumed to be of roughly comparable value and the criterion used in this
report is to maximize the expected number of targets destroyed. It is
assumed here that the targets do not vary in value with time, but that
case is discussed briefly in section 6.
For planning purposes on a larger scale it is possible that a more
versatile measure of effectiveness would be desired, but for the examination
of alternative tactics the criterion of maximizing the expected number of
targets destroyed serves as a useful means of comparing alternatives.
Problem Description.
The basic problem addressed in this report is the problem of
allocating a fixed force of imperfect offensive missiles to a fixed set
of targets. There are two groups of targets or target complexes. Within
each complex is some fixed number of targets known to the offense. Each
complex is defended by known numbers of imperfect defensive missiles each
of which can be used against any missile approaching any target in that
complex.
The attacking missiles can be directed to either the targets
themselves or to the defensive missile launching complex, probably the
control radars. It is assumed that if an offensive missile which is
aimed at the defensive complex penetrates the defense and hits its target,
the entire force of defensive missiles is rendered useless. If an offen-
sive missile is destroyed or misses its intended target it does no damage
at all.
The offensive problem is to determine how many missiles to direct
toward each of the two target complexes and how many of these should be
allocated to the defensive missiles and how many to the actual targets.
The attack can be thought of as sequential, the offense first
directing some number of attackers to the defensive system and then the
remainder to the targets themselves. We assume that the offense has no
damage assessment capability; that is, he can not tell which missiles if
any, have successfully penetrated to their targets. We also assume in
the report that the defense does not have the capability of attack evalu-
ation; that is, he can not determine in flight the impact point of an
incoming missile accurately enough that he dares to let it pass undefended
with the knowledge that it will impact harmlessly. Even if the defense
can determine the impact point he is assumed here to be unable to corre-
late that information in real time with the continued existence or previous
death of targets near the impact point. Thus we assume that as long as
the defense has missiles available he will not let offensive missiles
proceed undefended. We assume that the defense is one-on-one, but this
can easily be modified to include other possibilities.
The model is an offense-last-move model and assumes that the offense
knows both the number of targets and the number of defensive missiles in
each complex. Thus the offense will never allocate more attackers to the
defensive system than the number of defensive missiles because the supply
of defensive missiles will be exhausted at that point anyway.
Since the offense has no damage assessment capability
the best procedure for him to follow is to spread as evenly as possible
over the targets those re-entry vehicles which are allocated to targets.
The basic problem then is to determine the optimal allocation of
the fixed force of offenders to the defensive systems and the target
complexes to maximize the expected number of targets destroyed. See
Figure 1.












We will deal first with a single target complex and develop the
necessary relationships and then we will examine the allocation problem
between complexes. We let
t = the number of targets in the complex,
t
1
= the number of defenders guarding the complex,
A = the total number of attackers,
a = the number of attackers assigned to targets,
a' = the number of attackers assigned to defenders,
p = probability that an attacking missile kills its target when no
defender is used,
p = probability that a defensive missile which is assigned to an
attacker kills that attacker,
p = p (1-p ) , the probability that an attacking missile kills its
target when a defender is used.
Case 1: a :£ t
We consider first the case in which these are sufficiently many
targets so that regardless of how the attackers are split between defenders
and targets every attacker assigned to a target is assigned to a live
target.
If any of the first a' attackers penetrates the defense and kills
its target, it destroys all the defenders in which case the number remain-
ing is zero. On the other hand, if none of the first a' attackers
penetrates, the number of defenders remaining is exactly t 1 - a'.
Let p. = probability that exactly i defenders remain available for use









' * i = t' - a«.
Number the attackers beginning with the first one which is assigned to
a target and let
p
j
= probability that attacker j kills a target
We have
p! = p '{probability the target is defended}
3 a
+ p '{probability the target is not defended}.
The probability that the j— target is defended is the probability that
j or more defenders remain available for use after the initial attack





Pj = Pa (l-Pj ) Pk'Pj
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The expected total number of targets killed in the complex will be written
as ECt'jAja') and is
A-a'
E(t\A,a') = I p*
j=l J









Analytical efforts to maximize E(t',A,a') over a' have not been
successful, but for fixed values of p , p , A, and t' it is easy
to compute E(t',A,a') for all a' £ t'. The results can be plotted and
the best value of a' determined. This has been done for a few sample
cases and the results are shown in Figures 2-5.
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Case 2: a > t
In this case we consider the fact that if the number of attackers
substantially exceeds the number of targets, many attackers will be aimed
at targets previously killed and the computations in case 1 will give an
inflated estimate of the number of targets killed.
The modification required here is that the probability of kill for






ty no defenders survive the




probability (t*-a ! )
[initial attack on t
defenders survive
he defensive system •p ,
• p. I defenders survive
ak [_ j ' J
where, as before
p' = probability that the j— attacker kills a target,
and where
and
p , = probability that the j
—
offensive weapon imparts near enough
to the target to kill it. p , = p if the 2— attacker is
undefended and p = p, if the jth attacker is
defended,
p. = probability that the intended target is alive before the arrival
»f the jth attacker
It is appropriate to review the assumptions about how the attack
proceeds. We assumed that the offense shoots sequentially a' missiles
at the defensive system. The defense fires one defender at each of these
attackers providing he is capable of doing so. After the initial a
14
attackers are sent, the offense begins to fire sequentially at the t
targets. Since he receives no information about any target destroyed he
is unable to modify his attack plans so he simply fires at the targets
in order repeating the attack as long as his resources allow. Thus he
spreads his attackers as evenly as possible over the targets. If any
defenders survive the initial attack, the defense continues to fire one
defender at each of these attackers as long as his resources allow.
Letting E(t,t',A,a') be the expected number of targets killed
in case two we have
A-a'
































>K j=l * * j=t'-a'+l
where
[x] = largest integer in x,
n. = number of times the target of attacker j has been previously
*" attacked and defended, j > t' - a 1 , given that defenders
remained after the initial a 1 attackers,
m. = number of times the target of attacker j has previously been
** attacked and not defended, j > t 1 - a', given that defenders
remained after the initial a' attackers.
The expressions for n. and m. are derived below. They apply to the
case where the number of defenders available after the initial a' attackers
is t' - a 1 which is the number remaining when the attackers have failed
to destroy the defensive complex.
15
Let




= (t'-a') - k
L
t.
Thus t - r targets have exactly k defenders and r targets
exactly k + 1 defenders. We get for j > t' - a'





The total number of attackers previously (before the j
—
) fired at
the target of the j— attacker is [(j-l)/t] and defenders were used
against n. of these so the number against which there were no defenders
is
m.. = [(j-D/t] - n
, j > f - a'.
„
As in case 1 efforts to determine the maximum of E(t,t' >A,a l )
over a' have not proved successful but a program was written to compute
E for fixed values of t, t', A, p , p, and for all values of a'
a d
from 1 to t'. The results of some sample computations are shown in
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Using the results of the previous sections (case 2) a model was
constructed to evaluate how a fixed number of attackers should be allocated
to two target areas each containing a known number of targets and defended

















,t ! ,A. ,a !) , i = 1,2 as the expected number of
targets killed in area i given t. targets, t! defenders, A.
attackers a] of which are allocated to the defensive system.
Let
E*(t ,t!,A ) = max E (t
.
, t ! ,A . ,a \ ) i = 1,2.
a'<t-' 1111
The maximum expected total number of targets killed in the two target







) = I E*(t.,t:,A.).
i=l
The allocation problem is to maximize f (A ,A ) subject to A + A = A.
This can easily be accomplished numerically for particular values of the
parameters. The results of a sample computation are given in Table 1.




t' = 30 P
defenders








The assumption was made in doing the computations that f (A
,
,A-A )
is a unimodal function of A. This assumption has not been verified, but
numerical work, supports it. The assumption is equivalent to assuming that
the farther A is from the optimal value the worse the system perform-
ance is, but the assumption makes no other restriction on the shape of
the function nor any on the location of the maximum. With this assumption
a Fibonacci search procedure can be used to search for the maximum of
f (Ar A-A ) ,
see [A],
The computations were done for each value of A. selected by adding
the maximum number of targets destroyed in complex 1 to the maximum number
destroyed in complex 2. These quantities were computed using the model
described in case 2. Their sum gives f(A ,A-A ) for the particular value
of A .
The values of A.. considered in the Fibonacci search are shown in










) aj &1 E*^,^^) a^ a 2 f(A1 ,A-A ]L )
34 54 19.96 9 25 34.61 15 39 54.57
55 33 24.16 7 48 20.70 7 41 44.86
21 67 11.00 5 16 36.27 20 47 47.27
42 46 22.19 16 26 30.06 9 37 52.25
29 59 16.12 7 22 35.43 20 39 51.58
37 51 21.30 12 25 33.51 12 39 54.81
39 49 21.78 14 25 32.34 10 39 54.12
36 52 20.96 11 25 33.95 13 39 54.91
35 53 20.52 10 25 34.31 13 40 54.83
Table 1.
Sample Computations for the Allocation Model.
These results are pictured in Figure 10 along with the value of
fCA^A-A^ for A = 76.
It is interesting to compare these results with the results of the
purely subtractive model whose solution would be to fire all 88 weapons
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The objective function used in this report deals only with the
expected total number of targets destroyed and is subject to the criti-
cism that it does not deal with the distribution of the actual number of
targets destroyed. That is, after the attack on the defensive complex
is completed, either the defenders have been destroyed or they have not
and the subsequent battle will differ considerably in these two cases.
The decision maker's risk aversion can be dealt with, to some extent, by
providing him with additional information about the expected number of
targets destroyed. Instead of providing only the expected number, we
can also provide a curve which shows as a function of a' the expected
number of targets destroyed for each of these two conditions.
The objection that the actual number of targets destroyed may differ
considerably from the expected number and that using the expected number
may lead to unacceptable decisions is a reflection of the fact that the
decision maker has a marginal utility which is decreasing with the number





A number of interesting generalizations are possible in this model.
One easy extension is to permit p (and p,) to differ for the two
a d
target complexes. This difference might arise because the targets would
be attacked from different launch areas.
Another easy generalization would be to consider variations in the
defensive interceptor commitment policy. For example, we could consider
two-on-one defense for all attackers directed at the defensive complex.
Slightly more difficult generalizations involve changing the struc-
ture of the defensive complex to consist of several launcher groups.
Similarly, we could assume that the defenders are not rendered useless
until two attackers penetrate. This would be relevant for the case where
each launcher group has two control radars, either of which can control
the interceptors.
Generalizations could also be made by changing the assumption about
the knowledge available to the offense and defense. If the defense has
attack evaluation capability, his performance will be improved; or if
the offense has damage assessment capability he can increase the expected
number of targets destroyed.
A very interesting and apparently difficult extension is to assume
that some of the targets have a value which diminishes with time. If some
of the targets are offensive missile launchers there is no benefit in
attacking the launcher after the missile is gone. A model dealing with
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